International Crisis Group - After Baker-Hamilton: What to Do in Iraq

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Middle East Report N°60
19 December 2006

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Slowly, incrementally, the realisation that a new strategy is needed for Iraq finally is dawning on U.S. policy-makers. It was about time. By underscoring the U.S. intervention’s disastrous political, security, and economic balance sheet, and by highlighting the need for both a new regional and Iraqi strategy, the Baker-Hamilton report represents an important and refreshing moment in the country’s domestic debate. Many of its key – and controversial – recommendations should be wholly supported, including engaging Iran and Syria, revitalising the Arab-Israeli peace process, reintegrating Baathists, instituting a far-reaching amnesty, delaying the Kirkuk referendum, negotiating the withdrawal of U.S. forces with Iraqis and engaging all parties in Iraq.

But the change the report advocates is not nearly radical enough, and its prescriptions are no match for its diagnosis. What is needed today is a clean break both in the way the U.S. and other international actors deal with the Iraqi government, and in the way the U.S. deals with the region: in essence, a new multinational effort to achieve a new political compact between all relevant Iraqi constituents.

A new course of action must begin with an honest assessment of where things stand. Hollowed out and fatally weakened, the Iraqi state today is prey to armed militias, sectarian forces and a political class that, by putting short term personal benefit ahead of long term national interests, is complicit in Iraq’s tragic destruction. Not unlike the groups they combat, the forces that dominate the current government thrive on identity politics, communal polarisation, and a cycle of intensifying violence and counter-violence. Increasingly indifferent to the country’s interests, political leaders gradually are becoming warlords. What Iraq desperately needs are national leaders.

As it approaches its fifth year, the conflict also has become both a magnet for deeper regional interference and a source of greater regional instability. Instead of working together toward an outcome they all could live with – a weak but united Iraq that does not present a threat to its neighbours – regional actors are taking measures in anticipation of the outcome they most fear: Iraq’s descent into all-out chaos and fragmentation. By increasing support for some Iraqi actors against others, their actions have all the wisdom of a self-fulfilling prophecy: steps that will accelerate the very process they claim to wish to avoid.

Two consequences follow. The first is that, contrary to the Baker-Hamilton report’s suggestion, the Iraqi government and security forces cannot be treated as privileged allies to be bolstered; they are simply one among many parties to the conflict. The report characterises the government as a “government of national unity” that is “broadly representative of the Iraqi people”: it is nothing of the sort. It also calls for expanding forces that are complicit in the current dirty war and for speeding up the transfer of responsibility to a government that has done nothing to stop it. The only logical conclusion from the report’s own lucid analysis is that the government is not a partner in an effort to stem the violence, nor will strengthening it contribute to Iraq’s stability. This is not a military challenge in which one side needs to be strengthened and another defeated. It is a political challenge in which new consensual understandings need to be reached. The solution is not to change the prime minister or cabinet composition, as some in Washington appear to be contemplating, but to address the entire power structure that was established since the 2003 invasion, and to alter the political environment that determines the cabinet’s actions.

The second is that it will take more than talking to Iraq’s neighbours to obtain their cooperation. It will take persuading them that their interests and those of the U.S. no longer are fundamentally at odds. All Iraqi actors who, in one way or another, are participating in the country’s internecine violence must be brought to the negotiating table and must be pressured to accept the necessary compromises. That cannot be done without a concerted effort by all Iraq’s neighbours, which in turn cannot be done if their interests are not reflected in the final outcome. For as long as the Bush administration’s paradigm remains fixated around regime change, forcibly remodelling the Middle East, or waging a strategic struggle against an alleged axis composed of Iran, Syria, Hizbollah and Hamas, neither Damascus nor Tehran will be willing to offer genuine assistance. Though they may indeed fear the consequences of a full-blown Iraqi civil war, both fear it less than they do U.S. regional ambitions. Under present circumstances, neither will be prepared to save Iraq if it also means rescuing the U.S.

In short, success in Iraq, if it still can be achieved at this late date, will require three ambitious and interrelated steps:

A new forceful multilateral approach that puts real pressure on all Iraqi parties: The Baker-Hamilton report is right to advocate creation of a broad International Support Group; it should comprise the five permanent Security Council members and Iraq’s six neighbours. But its purpose cannot be to support the Iraqi government. It must support Iraq, which means pressing the government, along with all other Iraqi constituents, to make the necessary compromises. It also means agreeing on rules of conduct and red-lines regarding third party involvement in Iraq. This does not entail a one-off conference, but sustained multilateral diplomacy.

A conference of all Iraqi and international stakeholders to forge a new political compact: A new, more equitable and inclusive national compact needs to be agreed upon by all relevant actors, including militias and insurgent groups, on issues such as federalism, resource allocation, de-Baathification, the scope of the amnesty, and the timetable for a U.S. withdrawal. This can only be done if the International Support Group brings all of them to the negotiating table, and if its members steer their deliberations, deploying a mixture of carrots and sticks to influence those on whom they have particular leverage.

A new U.S. regional strategy, including engagement with Syria and Iran, an end to efforts at regime change, revitalisation of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and altered strategic goals: Polite engagement of Iraq’s neighbours will not do; rather, a clear redefinition of Washington’s objectives in the region will be required to enlist regional, but especially Iranian and Syrian help. The goal is not to bargain with them, but to seek agreement on an end-state for Iraq and the region that is no one’s first choice, but with which everyone can live.

There is no magical solution for Iraq. But nor can there be a muddle-through. The choice today could not be clearer. An approach that does not entail a clean break vis-à-vis both Iraq and the region at best will postpone what, increasingly, is looking like the most probable scenario: Iraq’s collapse into a failed and fragmented state, an intensifying and long-lasting civil war, as well as increased foreign meddling that risks metastasising into a broad proxy war. Such a situation could not be contained within Iraq’s borders. With involvement by a multiplicity of state and non-state actors and given that rising sectarianism in Iraq is both fuelled by and fuels sectarianism in the region, the more likely outcome would be a regional conflagration. There is abundant reason to question whether the Bush administration is capable of such a dramatic course change. But there is no reason to question why it ought to change direction, and what will happen if it does not.

RECOMMENDATIONS

STEPS TO INTERNATIONALISE CONFLICT-RESOLUTION

To the Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council:

1.) Establish an International Support Group, composed of the five permanent members of the Security Council, Iraq’s neighbours and the UN, represented by its Secretary General, with the objective of:

     (a) agreeing on rules of the game for outside parties vis-à-vis Iraq;

     (b) reaching agreement on broad goals and key compromises for Iraq;

     (c) appointing an empowered UN special envoy to begin work with all Iraqi constituents on a reconciliation process; and

     (d) convening a conference of all of Iraq’s political stakeholders (including insurgent groups and other disenfranchised but politically significant elements of society).

STEPS TO ENSURE REGIONAL COOPERATION

To the U.S. Government:

2.) Alter regional strategy, renouncing in particular ambitions to forcibly remodel the Middle East.

3.) Refrain from referring to Iraq as a “model” for the region or the new “front” in the anti-terrorism war.

4.) Engage in discussions with Iran and Syria in a direct and sustained manner that acknowledges they have legitimate interests in Iraq’s and the region’s future.

5.) In the context of the Quartet, and together with Arab countries, revitalise the search for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.

To the Government of Syria:

6.) Enhance control at the Iraqi border.

7.) Facilitate achievement of a national Iraqi compact by:

     (a) using its extensive intelligence on and lines of communication with insurgent groups to facilitate negotiations; and

     (b) drawing on its wide-ranging tribal networks to reach out to Sunni Arabs in the context of such negotiations.

To the Government of Iran:

8.) Enhance control at the Iraqi border.

9.) Facilitate achievement of a national compact by using its leverage to control SCIRI and its channels in southern Iraq to influence the Sadrists.

To the Government of Saudi Arabia:

10.) Facilitate achievement of a national compact by using its influence with insurgent groups, in particular by cutting off funding from private Saudi sources to those that refuse to cooperate.

To the Government of Turkey:

11.) Facilitate achievement of a national compact by using its influence with all Iraqi actors, including insurgent groups.

12.) Continue to develop peaceful economic and political relations with Iraqi Kurdistan.

STEPS TO ACHIEVE A NEW IRAQI POLITICAL COMPACT

To the Iraqi Government, Political Parties, and Insurgent and Militia Groups:

13.) Work with the UN special envoy and attend the International Support Group’s conference to reach agreement on a political compact focused on power and wealth sharing, including:

     (a) an asymmetric federal system providing a separate status for the Kurdish region, as currently defined and with powers broadly described in the constitution, and an Arab Iraq divided into fifteen decentralised governorates that reflect present boundaries;

     (b) acceptance of Kirkuk governorate as a decentralised governorate with an interim power-sharing arrangement to last at least ten years; and a UN envoy appointed to facilitate this arrangement and help create a mechanism to determine the governorate’s final status;

     (c) a process for equitable revenue sharing, under which income from oil, gas and other natural resources would accrue to a federal trust fund operated by an independent federal authority and would be distributed according to each region’s demographic share;

     (d) a relaxation of de-Baathification measures, with the principal criterion for exclusion being past proven crimes, not past party membership;

     (e) passage of a broad amnesty covering individuals who agree to put down their arms and subscribe to the national compact;

     (f) reintegration of officers of the former army unless proven to have committed human rights abuses or other crimes;

     (g) negotiation with the U.S. of a relatively rapid timetable for the full withdrawal in stages of its forces;

     (h) agreement on a status of foreign forces, with rules of engagement focusing on the need to protect populations and respond to immediate threats against troop security, while requiring prior Iraqi command authorisation for any manoeuvres, offensives, arrest campaigns or other military actions outside this framework; and

     (i) agreement on a new electoral law providing for direct, constituency-based elections.

To Members of the Recommended International Support Group:

14.) Guide Iraqi participants in a peace conference towards accepting a national compact along the lines described above.

15.) Condition further and augmented economic support on quick agreement on and implementation of elements of the national compact.

To the Government of Iraq:

16.) Organise, assuming agreement on a national compact is reached and reflected in a revised constitution, a referendum for its approval.

URGENT STEPS TO STEM THE VIOLENCE

To the Government of Iraq:

17.) Seek to reduce sectarian and ethnic polarisation and violence by:

     (a) stating publicly its commitment to work toward a new, more inclusive national compact, as described in this report;

     (b) condemning and seeking to halt the killing of civilians and torture by security forces, investigating allegations of abuse and prosecuting offenders;

     (c) suspending police units suspected of serious human rights abuses and participation in sectarian violence;

     (d) urging all government officials to desist from ethnic, sectarian or otherwise inflammatory statements, and pressing members of the council of representatives to do the same;

     (e) making a deliberate and widely announced effort to provide health services, opening bank branches and fixing power supply in predominantly Sunni Arab towns and neighbourhoods; and

     (f) making a commitment to a peaceful solution to the Kirkuk question, and postponing referendums to determine its and other disputed areas’ status.

To the U.S. Government:

18.) Adopt a less aggressive military posture in Iraq by:

     (a) redirecting resources to a program of embedding U.S. troops in Iraqi units; and

     (b) moving away from fighting the insurgency to focusing on protecting the civilian population, and in particular halting blind sweeps that endanger civilians, antagonise the population and have had limited effect on the insurgency.

19.) Redeploy troops along the frontlines of the unfolding civil war, notably by filling in the current security vacuum in Baghdad.

20.) Focus on limiting the militias’ role to protecting civilians in places where government forces cannot, rather than seek to forcibly disband them, while taking strong action against political assassinations, sectarian attacks, or attempts to overrun government offices.

21.) Avoid steps to engineer a cabinet reshuffle aimed at side-lining Muqtada al-Sadr, which would further inflame the situation.

22.) Shelve plans to hurriedly expand the Iraqi security apparatus and focus instead on vetting, restructuring, and retraining existing units.

23.) Free and compensate Iraqi prisoners detained by the U.S. without charge.

24.) Compensate Iraqis who have suffered as a result of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign.

25.) Condition short-term financial support on the government reversing its policy of serving certain constituencies at the expense of others (most notably with regard to salary payment and basic service delivery).

26.) Abandon the super-embassy project and move a reduced embassy to a more neutral location.

27.) Publicly deny any intention of establishing long-term military bases or seeking to control Iraq’s oil.

Baghdad/Amman/Damascus/Brussels, 19 December 2006

Local Organizer Checklist

The Declaration of Peace - Phase 3
May through September 2007

Thank you for participating in Phase 3 of The Declaration of Peace Campaign!

Below is a suggested Checklist of Next Steps for your local organizing, and links to resources on the Declaration of Peace website

Contact us if you have questions, need assistance, or want to find out more about how you and your local group can get involved.

E-mail us at: info@declarationofpeace.org

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STEP 1:
Identify and coordinate actions with partner organizations, groups, and individuals in your community.

• Contact Declaration of Peace signers in your town, state, zip code or Congressional District by requesting the list of signers in your area. E-mail your request to: info@declarationofpeace.org
• Find other local organizers in your town and state
• View the list of endorsing organizations across the country
• Search the United For Peace and Justice Directory of member organizations in your area

STEP 2:
Schedule a visit with your Congressional Representative to “Defund the War,” and Express public support for the Declaration of Peace Goals

• Develop a strategy for working with your Representative and Senators.
• Download a copy of the Declaration of Peace Congressional Talking Points.
• Download a copy of the 2007 Congressional Declaration of Peace for your Representative and Senators to sign.

STEP 3:
Develop an Action Plan for your participation in The Declaration of Peace Days of Action, September 14 - 21, 2007.

• Plan local nonviolent civil disobedience actions and other acts of peaceful resistance around the International Day of Peace, September 21, 2007.

STEP 4:
Schedule a nonviolence training in your community to prepare for the Summer and Fall 2007 nonviolent actions.

• Check the training calendar for trainings in your area.
• Submit a request for nonviolence training at: training@declarepeace.org
• Are you a trainer? Sign up for the training network

STEP 5:
Identify a local Media Coordinator or develop a local Media Team.

• Check out the Media Resource Kit

STEP 6:
Post your plans for local actions at the Declaration of Peace website.

• Post local Declaration of Peace events

STEP 7:
After your action, post your reports and news coverage of your local action at the Declaration of Peace website.

• Post your reports and media coverage of your local Declaration of Peace action

Additional Suggestion:
Schedule a Declaration of Peace inspirational speaker to talk to your community about the importance of engaging in nonviolent acts of war resistance.

• To schedule a speaker, write to: info@declarationofpeace.org

The success of this campaign will be the result of the dedication and leadership of organizers like you representing local and regional groups throughout the United States!

For more information, please feel free to contact us:

• General Information: info@declarationofpeace.org
• Local Organizing Coordination: local@declarepeace.org
• Nonviolence Trainings: training@declarepeace.org
• Declaration of Peace Speakers Bureau: info@declarationofpeace.org

Our mailing address is:

The Declaration of Peace
P.O. Box 6163
Bloomington, Indiana 47404-6163
Phone: (812) 988-1917

Media Resource Kit

Secrets to Successful Media Work

• Follow-up phone calls are absolutely essential after you send out a press release.
• Think long term and never burn your bridges with editors and producers. You will have to go back to them.
• Develop working relationships with reporters and become identified as sources for good stories.
• Think about news from the perspective of people inside the newsroom.
• Think visually and exploit “photo opportunities” to get your message across.
• Accept that at times you will strike out. It happens to everyone.
• Finally, reporters are people. Thank them for considering your story even when they say no.

Recommended Resource: “Making the News - A Guide for Activists and Nonprofits” is a good beginners guide to media work. Westview Press.

[Peter Wirth of GW Associates]

• Martin Luther King had a favorite saying, “One tiny little minute, just sixty seconds in it. I can’t refuse. I dare not abuse it. It’s up to me to use it.” Today we call it the sound bite.
  Read Peter Wirth’s article, Activists and the Mass Media - Dancing with the Devil
  
  

Phase 1: Congressional Pledge Guide

A Call Upon Congress to Sign the Congressional Declaration of Peace Pledge:

The purpose of this document is to assist you in securing your Congressional Representatives signature on the Declaration of Peace Congressional Pledge For an end to the US war and Occupation in Iraq.

You and your organization(s) may use one or more of the following forums to let them know you want them to sign on to the Declaration of Peace Congressional Pledge:

• Coordinated e-mail, write in and phone campaigns.
• Delegations to Congressional district offices
• Town Hall Meetings
• Public events (interfaith services; public reading of the US and Iraqi war dead; processions; vigils).
• Confronting members of Congress at public appearances

Resource Highlight:
The Iraqi Civil Conflict: Another Reason for Bringing the Troops Home
by Raed Jarrar (published on July 12, 2006 in Foreign Policy in Focus)

What is the Congressional Pledge?
The Congressional Declaration of Peace Pledge is a commitment by your Representative and Senators to the demands of the Declaration of Peace, and to cosponsor legislation that will create momentum for a comprehensive plan to end the war and occupation of Iraq.

The Declaration of Peace Congressional Pledge specifically asks members of Congress to co-sponsor the following pieces of legislation:

In the US House of Representatives:

H.R.4232: End the War in Iraq Act of 2005 Introduced by Rep. Jim McGovern (D-MA)
This bill uses the Congressional power of the purse strings to end the war. Cuts off all funding for U.S. military action in Iraq, while providing for the safe and orderly withdrawal of all U.S. troops. The bill allows spending on reconstruction by agencies other than the Dept. of Defense. Bill Summary/Status Cosponsors

H.Con.Res.348: Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to accomplishing the mission in Iraq Introduced by Rep. Mike Thompson (D-CA) States that:

• the United States should not maintain a permanent military presence or military bases in Iraq;
• the United States should not attempt to control the flow of Iraqi oil; and
• United States Armed Forces should be re-deployed from Iraq as soon as practicable after the completion of Iraq’s constitution making process or September 30, 2006, whichever comes first.

H.Con.Res.197: No Permanent Bases in Iraq Introduced by Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) Prohibits the U.S. from entering into any military base agreement with Iraq that would lead to a permanent U.S. military presence in Iraq.

In the US Senate:

S.Con.Res.93: Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to accomplishing the mission in Iraq Introduced by Sen. Tom Harkin (D-IA)
Companion bill to H.Con.Res. 348, Introduced by Rep. Mike Thompson (D-CA):

• The U.S. should not maintain a permanent military presence or military bases in Iraq;
• U.S. should not attempt to control the flow of Iraqi oil; and,
• U.S. armed forces should be re-deployed from Iraq as soon as practicable after the completion of Iraq’s constitution-making process, or by December 31, 2006.

Check to see if your Representative has signed on to these or other anti-war resolutions at the United for Peace and Justice website (scroll down to “How does your Representative Stand on the Iraq War?”). You can find additional information on other legislation on Iraq and Iran on this website. More background information on House and Senate action on the war is available here.

There are no Senate co-sponsors on the Harkin resolution, so every member of the Senate has to get pressure to sign on!

If you are not sure who your Represents you in the House and the Senate, Project Vote Smart can help you get the details. Simply go to http://www.vote-smart.org and enter your nine-digit zip code in the “Find Your Representative” box at the upper left-hand search box at the top of the page. (If you do not know your full zip code, the website provides you with an opportunity to find it.) By clicking on the names of legislators, you will be taken to a page with their background information as well as their contact details for both their Washington, D.C. and in-district offices.

Contact your Representative and Senators: Ask them to sign the Pledge

If your Congresspersons are either sponsors or cosponsors of all the above bills then call, email or fax them thanking them for the strong support in ending the US war and Occupation of Iraq. They still should be asked to sign the Declaration of Peace Congressional Pledge!

Remember that (unless you live in Washington DC or one of the US territories) you have one Representative and two Senators – you need to contact all three!)

Your initial contact should be a phone call.
Call the Capitol switchboard at (202) 224-3121 to reach any office (House or Senate). Tell the person who answers the phone that you’re a constituent from [your town], and you’d like to make a request regarding Iraq policy. Ask to speak to the Legislative Director or the Legislative Assistant on Iraq Policy. Since this is your initial contact, keep things brief and businesslike. This is not the time to argue with the staff person (that will probably come later!)

Sample script:
Identify yourself and your organization
I am participating in the Declaration of Peace, and have committed myself to working for a comprehensive, concrete and rapid plan to end the US war and occupation in Iraq,
I would like Representative/Senator X to join me in this pledge. Can I email you a copy of the pledge for his/her consideration?
Should I send it directly to you?
What is your email address?
[Make sure you get the name and the correct email of the person you should send the email to]
Thank you

Next, send an email with a copy of the pledge.
This will work best as part of a coordinated email campaign – get as many similar emails to each office as possible!

Sample email
The US war in Iraq is an endless fire consuming lives, resources, and the fragile possibilities of peace. Every day that Congress refuses to act to end the Iraq war, an average of 2 U.S. soldiers dies, along with dozens of innocent Iraqi people. Instead of quenching this fire, the US occupation intensifies it. As Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, former director of the National Security Agency, put it in a recent sharply worded article in Foreign Policy, “America must withdraw from Iraq now.”

Most Americans, Iraqis and even U.S. service members agree that the U.S. military needs to get out of Iraq.

I know that you support the U.S. troops and want them to come home safely. I ask you to show your commitment to ending the war in Iraq by signing the Declaration of Peace Congressional Pledge:
[you should include the pledge in the text of the email and as an attachment]

I will call you next week to follow up on this request.
Thank you,
Your name, email and address

Follow-up
After one week, call your contact back and ask if the Rep./Sen. has signed the pledge, or if they plan to sign it.

If yes – thank them and ask them what pieces of legislation they will co-sponsor (if they agree to sign this pledge, they have probably already signed on to most of the legislation!) Ask them to send you a copy of the pledge. Write a letter to the editor praising this politician for courage and leadership etc.

If no – ask why not, try to get specifics. This is important so that you can address their concerns if they are just minor. If the politician supports the war, make the staff person tell you why. Don’t argue! It will be frustrating, but you will have more power if you don’t argue now. Get as much information as you can on the Congressperson’s views, so that you can gather facts to counter them.

Please share the answer you get with us at: . Send an email that includes: (1) Your name; (2) Your organization; (3) Your Representative/Senator’s name; and (4) The answer you received, and their reasons why. This will help us track action and response.

If they Refuse to Sign the Pledge:

If your Representative and/or Senators refused to sign the pledge – design a campaign to move them one, or two, or more steps closer to opposing the war. Consider using Constituent pressure along with Public pressure.

Forms of Constituent Pressure

Write:
Send letters or postcards to the LOCAL office (find the address at http://www.vote-smart.org). Keep the letters short, to the point and polite.

Email:
Organize an e-mail campaign, but remember that these are most effective if people use their own words, and if e-mails are sent via the Rep./Sen.’s own website.

Local meetings:
Congress is on recess from the beginning of August through Labor Day, in September they will have shorter work weeks and will probably be in their districts from Thursday night – Tuesday morning. Call now to make an appointment to meet with them. You will have a better chance of getting a meeting with your Rep. or Senator if you organize a strong delegation to attend the meeting. Invite veterans of the Iraq war or their family members, members of the clergy, the business community, and other community leaders.

You can find local contact information for your legislators at: Project Vote Smart .

Call the office that you want to visit and explain that you would like to meet with the legislator and why. Tell the person you speak to that you are a constituent. They will probably ask you to fax in or e-mail the request.

Additionally here is some guidance for an effective meeting:

Make an Appointment:
No one likes people to “stop by” unannounced. When you do so, you are likely to get the cold shoulder. Always contact the office to set up a meeting even with staff. This shows respect for their time, and makes it more likely that you will meet with the right person(s). When you request the meeting, be sure to give the name of the organization, the purpose of the meeting, and how many people will be attending it.

Plan Your Visit Carefully:
Know where your legislator stands on the war (you have already gathered information on the UFPJ website, and in your conversation with the staff person). The delegation should meet in advance of the meeting to assign a note taker, a facilitator and decide who will speak when and to what issue. If you have a vet or a military family member, make sure they play a major role in the meeting and are able to tell their story.

Be Prompt and Patient:
When it is time to meet, be punctual and be patient. It is not uncommon in a busy legislator’s office to have to wait because of constantly changing schedules.

Be Prepared:
Whenever possible, bring to the meeting information and materials supporting your position.

Be Concrete:
Be clear on your “demand” and ask for a commitment to their Signing the Declaration of Peace Congressional Pledge. If they are not ready to sign the pledge, ask them for a commitment to co-sponsor legislation.

Follow Up:
Follow up the meeting with a thank you letter that outlines the different points covered during the meeting, and send along any additional information and materials requested. If you asked for a commitment but did not get one, repeat the request and note that you look forward to a response.

Also follow up with a letter to the editor reporting on the meeting for all the constituents who were not there!

Articles and Talking Points

Talking Points:

• June 22, 2007 - Iraq War Funding, 2008: Questions & Answers
  By Jeff Leys, Voices for Creative Nonviolence

From Phase 2:

• Declaration of Peace Talking Points - Phase 2 - (Word Doc, 85k)
• Declaration of Peace – March Actions Talking Points - (Word Doc, 24k)

Analysis:

• May 8 - Iraq and Afghanistan Supplemental Spending 2008
  Jeff Leys, Voices for Creative Nonviolence, May 8 2007
• May 1 - Phyllis Bennis, The Bush Veto, Iraq Funding and Permanent Occupation, Institute for Policy Studies, May 1 2007
• Juan Cole, “How to Get Out of Iraq”, The Nation, posted April 9, 2007 (April 23, 2007 issue)
• After Baker-Hamilton: What to Do in Iraq, International Crisis Group, Middle East Report N°60, December 19, 2006. - view the full report as a PDF file in A4 or in MS-Word format, by registering on the International Crisis Group website. Registration is free. You can also read the EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS by the International Crisis Group, Middle East Report N°60, December 19, 2006.

Articles:

• June 18, 2007 - Building Nonviolent Resistance to the 2008 Iraq War Supplemental By Jeff Leys
• May 10, 2007 - Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: Where Do We Go From Here? By Ken Butigan
• April 5, 2007 - Tom Hayden: Stop the Dirty War By Tom Hayden
• March 18, 2007 - Tomgram: Anthony Arnove on the Anniversary from Hell By Tom Engelhardt and Anthony Arnove, TomDispatch
• January 24, 2007, Printed on February 1, 2007 - Winning the (Anti) War and Rebuilding Political Imagination
  By Dan Berger and Andy Cornell, WireTap
• October 2006 - The Way Out of War: A blueprint for leaving Iraq now
  By George S. McGovern and William R. Polk
  Harper’s Magazine
• September 26, 2006 - Most Iraqis Favor Immediate U.S. Pullout, Polls Show
  Washington Post
• August 14, 2006 - Lt. Ehren Watada’s Speech: “Soldiers Can Choose to Stop Fighting” Veterans for Peace Convention - August 12, 2006 - (Editorial by Dahr Jamail that includes a transcript of the speech and a video link, published in Truthout.org on)
• July 12, 2006 - The Iraqi Civil Conflict: Another Reason for Bringing the Troops Home - by Raed Jarrar (published on July 12, 2006 in Foreign Policy in Focus)